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STATUTORY ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE TIlE "YELLOW DOG" CONTRACT-
Since the peak year of 1920 the ranks of organized labor have been constantly
decreasing from year to year.' In part this is due to the recession from abnormal
war conditions, in part to technical improvements in the field of labor which have
resulted in a growing army of unemployed. Along with these must be placed
the introduction of company unions and the use of "yellow dog" contracts by the
employer. The former, which were unquestionably fostered for the purpose of
bringing about amicable relations between the employer and employee,2 have
made serious inroads upon the trade unions. Tolerant as one may be of the
activities of these organizations, there is no doubt that their bargaining p'ower is
considerably less than that of the independent organization.3 Aggrieved as they
are at this new form of competition, labor unions have been even more resentful of
the "ycllow dog" contract.4 The number of men working under these contracts
has been estimated at a million and a quarter.' What proportion of the decline
in trade unionism can be directly attributed to the anti-union contract cannot be
accurately estimated, but it is more likely that they have acted as an impediment
rather than as a destructive force. Regardless whether these contracts assisted
in the decline or not, the antagonism and ill-feeling which they have inspired
make them a pressing matter in the field of American labor problems. 6
"Yellow dog" contracts are all directed toward one purpose-the abstention
of the employee from union activities. In return for employment he may promise
not to join a union, or not to join a union while continuing in the employment.
Others may take the form of a promise not to agitate for, or join in any strike,
or not to do anything to interfere with the employer's conduct of an open shop.7
The consideration for these promises is the employment, but whether it be for
a stated time or at will, the employer invariably reserves the right to discharge for
'See HUNT, AN AUDIT OF AMERICA (1930) 8I, 83. In 22 ENcyc. BRIT. (I4th ed. 1929)
384, the number is put at 5,11o,8oo for 192o compared with 3,903,800 for the year 1927.2
WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932) 4, 5. "The solid front of the
employers, their more enlightened policy, their welfare work, and their company unions, the
surplus in the labor market, all operated to keep down the number of strikes in the last decade.
What has happened during the present depression, however, suggests that the pendulum may
soon swing the other way."
These organizations are sponsored by the employer and all employees are then required
to join them, at the same time promising to join no other organization. On company unions,
see Leiserson, Employee Representation--A Warning to BotJv Employer and Employee
(1928) 13 ACAD. OF POL SCI. PRoc. 96.
""Company unions are an anathema to organized labor, yellox, dog contracts still more
so." WIrrE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 220. See further 75 CONG. IZc. 4832-4833, 4836-4837
(1932). It was a decision upholding the yellow dog contract which caused organized labor
to combat the vigorous and successful campaign against the appointment of Judge Parker to
the Supreme Court bench. 72 CONG. REc. 6569, 7449, 7793, 7808-7822, 7930-7954, 7976, 8021-
8048, 8o86-8o98, 8120, 8181, 8337, 8358, 8423, 8475, 8567 (1930).
'WITTE, "Yellow Dog" Contracts (193o) 6 Wis. L. REv. 21. "A recent estimate from
labor sources gives I,125,ooo as the number now employed under yellow dog contracts. This
probably includes employees in many shops operated on a non-union basis without formal
contracts, and perhaps also, establishments which at one time had such contracts but have
discontinued them."
'In England, where the problem of labor law is now almost exclusively embraced in
legislation, the problem of yellow dog contracts has not arisen, probably due to the fact that
collective bargaining is the accepted method of dealing between employer and employee. THE
TRADES DISPUTES AND UNION AcT, 17 & 18 GEO. V, c. 22, 6, has, nevertheless, a provision
outlawing them.
'Various forms of the contract are set out in Cochrane, Why Organized Labor Is
Fighting "Yellow Dog" Contracts (1925) 15 A-t. LAB. LEG. REV. 227, 230.
(68)
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any number of stated reasons, leaving the length of the employment to his dis-
cretion."
In 1875 these contracts had already appeared in Massachusetts where they
were employed to break up a weaver's strike,9 and at about the same time they
were in use in Virginia,'" but their effect then was incomparable to the importance
they have since achieved. It is significant that they follow closely the first estab-
lished and unified trade movement in America." State statutes which, in attempt-
ing to remove impediments to the growth of the trade unions, made it a crime
for employers to discriminate against an employee because of union affiliations,
were soon before the courts. These statutes were held unconstitutional because
of their interference with the employer's right to make and terminate such employ-
ment contracts as he deemed best.12 Nevertheless the number of these statutes
continued to grow,' 3 and in 1898 the national government passed the Erdnan
Act.' ,
Within a short time the constitutionality of the Erdinan Act was brought
before the court in Adair v. United States.5 This statute, which had within it
a clause making it a misdemeanor for an employer to exact a non-union promise
as a condition of employment, was tested on that provision which prevented the
free discharge of an employee or discrimination against him because of union
affiliations. In answer to the argument that this part of the act was a necessary
adjunct to the scheme of arbitration and settlement of disputes in other parts of
the act, the court said very precisely:
"Congress could not, consistently with the Fifth Amendment, make it
a crime against the United States to discharge the employee because of his
being a member of a labor organization." 16
While the court repeated the formula that freedom of contract is subject to such
restraints as are necessary for the public health, welfare, morals or safety, an act
which was directed solely to the betterment of the position of the unions was not
deemed to be an exercise of the legitimate police power of the government. The
determination that the employer could not be forbidden to protect himself against
the unions in this manner, left it to the court to decide whether it was beyond
the scope of legitimate self defense for an employer to exact a non-union promise
from a prospective employee." The court met this situation seven years later
when the Kansas statute invalidating the "yellow dog" contract came before the
court in Coppage v. Kansas.18 Apparently the situations were considered for all
practical purposes indistinguishable, for:
"Under a Constitutional freedom of contract, whatever either party has
the right to treat as sufficient ground for terniinating the employment, where
there is no stipulation on the subject, he has the right to provide against by
S See for example the contract set out in Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green et al.,
131 Misc. 682, 227 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1928).
0
McNEIL, THE LABOR MOVEMENT-THE PROBLEM OF TODAY (1887) 224-225.
" WARE, THE LABOR MOVEMIENT IN THE UNITED STATES I860-1895 (1929) 124.
n By i88o, the Knights of Labor, organized in I869 and pursuing since then a secret ex-
istence, had appeared in the open as a union of all workers.
' Charles Gillespie v. People of the State of Illinois, I88 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007 (1900);
State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781 (1895); People of the State of New York v.
Harry Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073 (19o6) ; State ex reL. Zellmer v. Kreutzberg, 114
Wis. 530, 90 N. W. I098 (i902).
" See infra note 20.
1430 STAT. 424 (1898).
"208 U. S. I6i, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
'6 Id. at 176, 28 Sup. Ct. at 281.
1TFREUND, POLICE POWER (1904) § 326.
2236 U. S. I, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915).
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insisting that a stipulation respecting it shall be a sine qua non of the incep-
tion of the employment, or of its continuance if it be terminable at will. It
follows that this case is not distinguishable from Adair v. United States." 10
Fifteen similar state statutes 20 were in existence at the time of this decision and
upon its authority they have since been declared invalid by state tribunals,
2 1 or
remain upon the statute books as dead letters. Thus the first attempts at easing
the path of unionization by invalidating the "yellow dog" contract proved them-
selves objectionable on grounds of constitutionality.
The detision of the Supreme Court in the Coppage case established that the
legislature could not invalidate the "yellow dog" contract and that the employer
was within his rights 'in demanding that the employee sign such an agreement.
Nevertheless, although the prevalence of legislation against them is some indi-
cation that they were in widespread use, the effectiveness of the contract was as
yet extra-legal. Although it is true that the employer could sue the employee who
disregarded its terms, there is no record of any suit of this nature. There re-
mained the power to discharge for breaches and the psychological compulsion
upon workmen ignorant of the legal import of such contracts, -2 and it is the latter
which must have made their use profitable. The full importance of the anti-union
contract became established after the decision in the Hitchman case.23 It was
already well established before this case that an action lay for inducing breach of
contract and in several instances this action had been permitted in the case of
employment contracts terminable at will.24  In the Hitchinan case the plaintiff's
employees had signed contracts in which -they promised not to join unions while
continuing in plaintiff's employment, and when the union attempted to organize
the workers, an injunction was sought prohibiting the organizers from induc-
ing a breach of contract. Although there has been some dispute as to whether
the act of the union organizers actually caused a breach of the employment con-
tract,'" the court granted the petition and enjoined the unionization of the mine.
This injunction, sweeping in its nature, permitted contempt proceedings to be
brought under it four years later.26 The opinion, confusing in the extreme, has
been severely criticized, 2 but the value of the decision was not lost upon the
employer. Where previously the power of these contracts rested against an
Id. at 13, 35 Sup. Ct. at 243.
' Such statutes were in force in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Porto Rico and Wisconsin. Bull. of Bur. of Lab. Stat., No. 148, vols. I & 2.
" Montgomery v. Pacific Electric Co., 293 Fed. 68o (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ; People v.
Western Union, 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146 (1921) ; Gillespie v. Illinois, i88 Ill. 176, 58 N. E.
loo7 (19oo) ; Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Company v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac.
848 (1904) ; State ex rel. Smith v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 563 (912) ; Jackson v.
Berger, 92 Ohio St. 130, i3O N. E. 732 (1913).
See supra note 7 at 227.
Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (I917).
On the subject-of inducing breach of contract, see Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract
(1922) 36 HARV. L, REgv. 663; Carpenter, Interference With Contract Relations (927) 41
HARV. L. REV. 728.
'Justice Brandeis, dissenting in the Hitchman case, pointed out that there could be no
breach of the employment contract until the union both persuaded the men to join and at the
same time to stay in the employment since the promise was not to join a union while con-
tinuing in the employment. He concludes that there was no evidence of this, and that the
action of the union went merely to the extent of getting the men to agree to join the union
but not to breach their contract. See Note (1927) 41 HARv. L. Rm,. 770. The position of
Justice Brandeis has been criticized in Cary and Oliphant, The Present Status of the Hitch-
-man Case (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 440, 443-444; cf. Sayre, suipra note 24, at 69o-696.
Witte, supra note 5, at 27.
Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 779;
Carey and Oliphant, supra note 25; and see the articles cited supra note 24.
LEGISLATION
individual, they now became effective weapons against the union organizers and
against the union itself. In 1918 the spread of "yellow dog" contracts caused
labor to protest and their use was ordered abandoned by the War Labor Board."
However, when the power of that Board ceased, the movement to foreswear the
laborer from contact with unions was resumed.
Although the scope of the injunction has been somewhat modified in subse-
quent cases,2 9 the Hichman case has furnished authority for the issuance of in-
junctions in both state2 0 and federal courts.31  Many decisions have held that
such contracts are not contrary to public policy,3 2 but, within the last decade, the
courts of New York called upon to enforce such contracts decided that they were
without consideration.3 3 A similar position has been adopted by the Ohio Su-
preme Court,34 although both of these courts have left open the question whether
or not they would enforce such a contract if the employer had absolutely bound
himself to give employment for a specified period. While from a purely legalistic
standpoint one might quarrel with these decisions, they suggest at least a position
which might be adopted by other courts eager to solve a broad economic problem
through the application of common law principles."3
In approaching the court's decision upon any labor dispute it is important to
bear in mind that the substantial problem which the court must deal with-the
core of the dispute which gives rise to so many dissenting opinions-is that of
justification 36 If it be a strike which has precipitated the litigation, then the
court must decide whether the purpose of the strike justifies the infringement
upon the employer's rights.3 7  Every demand of labor and the means used to
NAT. WAR LAD. BD. DOCKET, pp. 19, 154, 1049.
'International Organization, United Mine Workers of America et al. v. Red Jacket
Consol. Coal & Coke Co., I8 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) (allowing persuasion of em-
ployees to join unions after quitting employment) ; Bittner v. West Virginia Pittsburgh
Coal Co., x5 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926) (permitted advertisement of benefits of
unions) ; Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Federation of Full Fashioned Workers et al.,
305 Pa. 207, 157 Atl. 588 (1931) (persuasion of employees permitted)..Callan v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 149 Ga. 119, 99 S. E. 300 (919); McMichael v.
Atlantic Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, IO8 S. E. 226 (1921); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v.
Fitzgerald, 237 Mass. 537, 13o N. E. (1921) ; Cyrus Currier & Sons v. International Mold-
ers Union, 93 N. J. Eq. 61, 115 AtI. 66 (1921); Skolny v. Hillman, 114 Misc. 571, 187 N. Y.
Supp. 21 (121) ; Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Lawson, 144 Tenn. 78, 229 S. W. 741 (1921).
31 See, in addition to the cases cited supra note 29, Armstrong et al. v. United States, iS
F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927) ; Montgomery v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 293 Fed. 68o (C. C.
A. 9th, 1923) ; Gasaway et al. v. Borderland Coal Corp., 278 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
'Vail Ballou Press v. Casey, 125 Misc. 689, 212 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1925) ; Nashville Ry.
& Light Co. v. Lawson, supra note 29; Platt v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R., 65 Fed. 66o
(C. C. E. D. Pa., 1894) ; but see (1922) 22 COL. L. Rav. 78.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 563 (1928) ; Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green et al., 131 Misc. 682, 227 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1928) ; Ex-
change Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Louis Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
3 La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co. v. Intvrnational Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, Local No. 8, et al., io8 Ohio St. 61, 34o N. E. 899 (1923).
See (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 305.
Carey & Oliphant, supra note 25, at 445. Compare the statement of Justice Harlan in
Coppage v. Kansas, supra note iS, at 35, 35 Sup. Ct. at 244, that: "No attempt is made, or
could reasonably be made, to sustain the purpose to strengthen these voluntary organizations,
as a legitimate object for the exercise of the police power" with the opinion of Justice
Holmes (dissenting) in Adair v. United States, supra note 15, at 191, 28 Sup. Ct. at 287, "But
suppose the only effect really were to tend to bring about the complete unionizing of such
railroad laborers as a Congress can deal with, I think that object alone would justify the act."
'Whether the purpose for which a strike is instituted is or is not a legal justification
for it, is a question of law to be decided by the court. . . . A strike is not a strike for a
legal purpose because the strikers struck in good faith for a purpose which they thought was
a sufficient justification for a strike, . . . the purpose of the strike must be one which the
court as matter of law decides is a legal purpose of a strike." DeMinico v. Craig et al., 207
Mass. 593, 598, 94 N. E. 317, 319 (91).
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accomplish this demand necessarily involves some encroachment upon the right
of the employer-some curtailment of his freedom."' It is the delicate balance
of these conflicting rights which determines and orders the court's decision.
Strikes (which must naturally infringe the interests of the employer) have justi-
fied themselves when undertaken in pursuit of better wages, hours or working
conditions." Since these improvements are -accomplished only through unions
and collective bargaining, the latter must in turn finally justify themselves in the
eyes of the court in order that they outweigh or at least equal the employer's right
in his anti-union contract. Only when the court has reached this conclusion can
we hope to see either legislation on the subject upheld or the "yellow dog" contract
refused aid in equity. The failure of the courts to accord to unionization and
collective bargaining a higher significance than the employer's unrestricted right
to contract has resulted in a situation whereby the employer, already in a superior
bargaining position, has been able to forestall the endeavors of his employees to
improve their own.
The unions have developed no effective means of combating the anti-union
contract. In a few instances, having previously secured workmen to enter into
agreements not to work for "yellow dog" employers, they have sought injunctions
against the efforts of the proselyting employer, but they met with no success.4°
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that labor has again resorted to legislation
for assistance. In 1925 the American Federation of Labor presented a standard
anti-"yellow dog" contract bill to the legislatures of Ohio and Indiana, and it ib
their announced purpose to press it in the legislatures of all states."1  To date it
has beer, enacted as law in Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon and Wis-
consin.4 2 The standard bill declares that any promise in an employment contract
by which an employee or employer promises not to. become or remain a member
of an employee's or employer's organization is contrary to the public policy of
the state and is thereby declared unenforceable in law or equity.
Thus, the constitutionality of these measures will again be presented within
a short time, and the authority of the Adair and Coppage cases, and the numerous
state decisions to the same effect, subject to re-examination in the light of experi-
ence and existing conditions. 3 There are two changes in the present act which
distinguish it from the previous statutes. In the first place, the present one is
not a penal statute, and the distinction between judicial non-enforcement and
penal legislation, although it effects no change in the substantial law sought to be
achieved, is nevertheless a modification which provokes less prejudice.4 In the
second place, the principle of correlation employed in the present statute is cer-
tainly an improvement in draftsmanship. 45  Again, however, the change is not a
"Nevertheless in numberless instances the law warrants the intentional infliction of
temporal damage, because it regards it as justified." Veghelan v. Guenther, 167 Mass. 92, io6,
44 N. E. 1077, 1O8O (1896).
'OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS (1927) § 321.
"'A discussion of contracts by unions to prevent their members from entering into"yellow dog" contracts is found in Stern, A New Legal Problem in the Relations of Capital
and Labor (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 523. Injunctions were unsuccessfully sought in
Nolan v. Farmington Shoe Manufacturing Co., 25 F. (2d) 9o6 (D. Mass., 1928); New
England Wood Heel Co. v. Nolan, 268 Mass. 191, 167 N. E. 323 (1929).
* See supra note 7, at 227.
ARIz. LAWS (193i) c. 19; COLO. LAWS (1931) c. 112; OHIo LAWS (193!) § 6241;
ORE. LAWs (93) c. 247: NLv. Co.%ip. LAwS (I9-Q')) § 10473; \\ Is. STAT. (193I) § 268.19.
On the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute see MacDonald, The Constitutionality
of Wisconsin's Statute Invalidating "Yellow Dog" Contracts (1931) 6 Wis. L. REV. 86.
"FREUND, POLICE POWER (1904) § 326; see Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional
Power Over the Labor Injunction (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 385. But the importance of this
change is minimized by MacDonald, supra note 43, at 91.
'FREuND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION (917) 240, 243.
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substantial one. Turning now to the labor decisions of the Supreme Court we
find that there has been no pronouncement on the subject of the anti-union con-
tracts statutes since the Coppage case, but this decision and that in the Adair case,
although often cited, have never been weakened. In fact as late as 1917 the
Court expressly reaffirmed the holding of these two cases.4" If the decision in
these cases be taken as laying down the premise that the legislature may in no
way interfere with the employment contract, that position would be unfounded.
The court has at various times upheld legislation prohibiting the use of child
labor, legislation limiting the hours of employment, and has held nugatory the
attempts to abolish by contract statutes abrogating the fellow servant rule.47 It
is to be noted that these decisions have dealt with concrete problems whose effect
on the physical status or welfare of the workman was not difficult of perception.
Demonstrable situations such as these are no indicia that the court will deem
within the permissible limits of legislation statutes whose justification, if any,
must rest on an abstract theory of social equalization.
There has been one decision the breadth of which might be said to be suffi-
cient to stand as a committal to a thoroughgoing unionizing policy and which
seems to grasp at a truer conception at the position of the workman than that of
previous cases. In this decision, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades
Council,48 Chief Justice Taft stated:
"They (labor unions)" were organized out of the necessities of the sit-
uation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer ...
Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with
their employer. . . . To render this combination at all effective, employees
must make their combination extend beyond one shop." 4
However, the decision merely permitted the use of peaceful persuasion to union-
ize the workers in a case where there was no interference with a contract. To
allow a technical legal right to stand in the way of unionizing activities after such
express recognition that the employee is "helpless" and that "union was essential"
might seem anomalous indeed, but dictum such as this is often considered inap-
plicable to a different situation, and the economic propensities of one judge are
often not shared by his colleagues, even though the legal results may be concurred
in by all.*0  More recently the court has recognized that free and independent
choice of representatives is essential if collective bargaining is to mean anything
at all; consequently the sanction they gave to a statute which imposed a duty not
to interfere with the free choice of those who are to adjust the terms between
employer and employee 5' would seem to bring them still closer to complete realiz-
ation that "liberty to contract" may mean a liberty to join voluntary associations
of workmen unhindered by the "yellow dog" contract.
0New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. I88, 206, 37 Sup., Ct. 247, 254 (1917).
' See Note (93) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1287. Sturges v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 220, 34
Sup. Ct. 6o (1913) (child labor) ; Muller v. Oregon, 2oS U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (19o8)
(hours of employment) ; cf. Lochner v. United States, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905) ;
Chicago B. & B. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 259 (1911) ; Shohoney v.
Quincy, etc., R. R., 231 Mo. 131, 132 S. W. 1059 (1910) (fellow servant rule).
ds257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921),
9 At 209, 42 Sup. Ct. at 78. This statement is in substance incorporated into the recent
anti-injunction bill, see infra note 56.
14 "The ground of decision really comes down to a proposition of policy of rather a deli-
cate nature concerning the merit of the particular benefits to themselves intended by the de-
fendants, and suggests a doubt whether judges with different economic sympathies might not
decide such a case differently when brought face to face with the issue." Holmes, Privilege,
Malice and Intent (1898) 8 HARv. L. REv_ i, 8.
" Texas & N. 0. Ry. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427 (1930).
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Realities must force us to the conclusion that workmen sign these agree-
ments under economic duress. Yet:
"Why do so many of them [the courts] force upon legislation an aca-
demic theory of equality in the face of practical conditions of inequality?
. . . Why is the legal conception of the relation of the employer and
employee so at variance with the common knowledge of mankind ?" 52
It is with these questions that Dean Pound assailed the statement of Justice
Harlan that (speaking of the employment contract) "in all such particulars the
employer and employee have equality of right." 53 Although it may be true that
the employee is free to decline an employment rather than enter into a non-union
contract, the thought that he will, contemplates a workman either of independent
means or most unique in his services. Bearing in mind that we, in common with
other industrialized countries, are now confronted with the problem of standing
unemployment, it can hardly be denied that his right to decline employment is
controlled in no small degree by the stern necessities of life. Moreover, the
recognition that inequality in wealth is a condition which must exist in view of
our economic and political system.5" and that it is current in all our commercial
transactions, connotes a failure- to differentiate between the ordinary transaction
involving the sale of a commodity and a transaction involving the sale of labor.
However much we are devoted to an outmoded policy of laissez-faire,.it must be
borne in mind that it was never intended that the state subserve the system, but
rather that the system serve the public.
In the last session of Congress, that body, in an attempt to curb the ever-
extending use of the injunction in labor disputes and to give labor greater freedom
of action, passed a bill "To Define and Limit the Jurisdiction of Courts Sitting in
Equity"'7 This is probably the most comprehensive labor enactment that this
country has ever seen and has, within its provisions,"0 a section whereby any
undertaking not to become or remain a member of an employee's or employer's
organization is declared unenforceable in any court of the United States '- and
denied the aid of law or equity. It must first be observed that as distinguished
from other acts of Congress designed to regulate the course of labor, this act was
not passed in pursuance of the power of Congress over interstate commerce.
The doubt expressed in the Adair case may have been sufficient to prove a deter-
Pound, Liberty of Contract (1908) I8 YALE L. J. 454.
'Adair v. United States, sup:'a note 15, at 175, 28 Sup. Ct. at 2,o.
" See Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 18, at 17, 35 Sup. Ct. at 245.
'U. S. PUBLIC ACT No. 65 (0932). This bill was drawn up with the assistance of Pro-
fessor Frankfurter, Professor Oliphant, Mr. Witte, Mr. Richberg and Professor Sayre.
For a discussion of the act and its possible effect on the law see Christ, The Federal Anti-
Injunction Bill (1931) 26 IL1 L. REv. 516; Chamberlain, The Federal Anti-In junction Act
(1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 477; for a discussion of the constitutional phases of the act see Frank-
furter and Greene, Congressional Power Over the Labor Ininiction (1931) 31 CoL L. REv.
385.
"3 Section 2 of the bill declares the public policy of the United States. Section 3 covers
the anti-union contract. Section 4 limits the scope of injunctive relief, and while this section
follows in many respects section 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 12 (5927), it omits the vitiating words "lawfully" and "unlawfully". See American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, supra note 49, at 2o3, 42 Sup. Ct. at 76 where
it was decided that this section of the Clayton Act did not change the law. Section 5 declares
that labor unions shall not be enjoined on the ground that they are engaged in an unlawful
conspiracy. Section 6 provides that no one shall be held responsible or liable in a labor dis-
pute unless upon clear proof of authorization, participation or ratification. The remainder
of the bill is mostly concerned with procedural changes. ,
' Section 13 (d) defines "court of the United States 'A as any court whose jurisdiction
has been or may be conferred or defined or limited by act of Congress, including the courts
of the District of Columbia.
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rent in this respect." Instead resort was had to the Congressional power over
the inferior courts of the United States.
As a depository of the judicial power of the United States, the Constitution
expressly provides for a Supreme Court, and leaves it to Congress to establish
other courts.5 9 The power of Congress to establish federal courts is patently a
non-enforceable duty, but having established them, it is not generally denied that
they may parcel out the jurisdiction in such manner as seems most advisable.
It is true that Judge Story early expounded the doctrine that the federal courts,
once established, automatically became vested with the entire judicial power.6"
This strong Federalist attitude was not shared by other judges, and the deci-
sions 01 and researches _01 have all inclined to the view that there exists in Congress
no small degree of control over the federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. 3 In Kline v. Burke Construction Company, Justice
Sutherland stated:
"The Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to
take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress
to confer it. And the jurisdiction having been conferred may, at the will of
Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and if withdrawn without a
saving clause, all pending cases though cognizable when commenced must
fall." 14
It is with this in mind that the federal anti-"yellow dog" contract provision
was passed. In the opinion of one authority, this section does not render these
contracts void but is merely "a restriction of the ambit of the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts." 05 As contrasted with the effect of the state statutes which, in
their deprivation of the court's assistance to such contracts, deprives them totally
of enforcement, the federal statute merely denies access to the federal courts. Only
if more courts adopt the position of the New York and Ohio courts or until the
state statutes are held constitutional would the "yellow dog" contract be totally
eliminated. The objection has been made to the federal statute that it is an
indirect attempt to encroach upon the power of the state."0 Such objection pro-
ceeds on the assumption that it is a substantive enactment. Were this so, there
would indeed be reason for such a statement, since it is estimated that seventy-five
'Adair v. United States, supra note 15, at 179, 28 Sup. Ct. at 282.
' U. S. Co-sT., Art. III, Sec. I; Art. I, Sec. 8.
SAfMartin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. 141 (i816) ; White v. Fenner, I Mason 52o (C.
C. Ist, i8i8); and this view was apparently shared by Judge Bushrod Washington in Ex
parle Cabrera, Fed. Cas. No. 2,278 (C. C. Pa. 16o5).Meyers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926) ; United States v. Union
Pacific R. R., 98 U. S. 569 (878) ; William F. Cary and Samuel T. Cary v. Edward Curtis,
3 How. 236 (U. S. 1845); Turner v. President, Directors and Company of the Bank of
North America, 4 Dall. 8 (U. S. 1799). The control of Congress over the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court is strikingly illustrated in E.r parle MTcCardle, 7 Wall. 5o6 (U.
S. 1868) where, while an appeal was under advisement in the Supreme Court, Congress with-
drew this part of their appellate jurisdiction and thereupon the court dismissed the case.
'Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37
HARV. L. Rav. 49; Frankfurter and Landis, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499; WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 1263; Frankfurter and Greene, Labor Injunctions anrd Federal
Legislation (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 766.
1 See Ex parte McCarle, supra note 62.
0126o U. S. 226 at 233, 43 Sup. Ct. 79 at 83 (1922).
Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional Power Over Labor Disputes, supra note 56,
at 401.
'Sen. Rep. 163, Part 2, 72d Cong. 1st Sess., No. 176, pp. 6, 7. This is due to the choice
of words in the particular section, which in some sense does infer that the contract is de-
clared void.
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per cent. of all labor controversies arise out of the diversity clause and involve
therefore purely local matters. 67 But the sole case which seems to have involved
this problem of indirect attempts is decidedly different from the instant statute,6"
and the objection that this is legislation upon a purely intrastate matter seems
therefore without merit.
On the whole, therefore, it would seem that this section may succeed in out-
lawing the "yellow dog" contract in the federal courts, but the possibility that
the Supreme Court will hold the state statutes constitutional seems more remote.
Nevertheless the state courts can do much to alleviate this situation by re-exam-
ining the premises upon which such inequitable obligations are enforced in equity.
It should be. recognized that continued enforcement of the anti-union contracts
will but encourage their use, and that this in turn has within it the potentiality
of destroying unions entirely. Today the union is accepted as part of our social
organization, and although there may be a difference of opinion as to its merits,
experience alone will disclose whether unionization will perform its function
adequately. But:
"Once we recognize that the rightof combination by workers is in itself
a corollary to the dogma of free competition, as a means of equalizing the
factors that determine bargaining power, it will place in truer perspective the
consequences of making the power of union effective." '6 9
It follows that the value of legislative efforts to accelerate this development must
necessarily be determined empirically. All else is speculation.
N. S.
'Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts
(1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 523, n. 123.
' United States v. Klein, 8o U. S. 128 (1871). This case involved the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, and embraced the construction of an act which specified that
after a pardon by the President and proof of such in the court of claims, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the pardon should be taken as conclusive evidence that the claimant did give
aid to the rebellion (Civil War), and on proof of such pardon, the jurisdiction of the court
shall cease. At page 146 the court said, "The court is required to ascertain the existence of
certain facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by dismissing
the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way?"
'Frankfurter and Greene, supra note 63, at 772.
